Representatives of nearly one-half of the 114 member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the United States, have participated in the development of an international nuclear safety convention-a proposed multilateral treaty to improve civil nuclear power reactor safety. A prehminary draft of the convention has been developed (referred to as the draft convention for this report), but discussions are continuing, and when the final convention text will be completed and presented to IAEA member states for signature is uncertain.
This report responds to the former and current Chairman's request that we provide information on the development of the nuclear safe@ convention, including a discussion of (1) the draft convention's scope and objectives, (2) how the convention will be implemented and monitored, (3) the views of selected country representatives on what provisions should be included in the draft convention, and (4) the convention's potential benefits and liln.itatiOnS. 
Re&lts in Brief
The scope of the convention ss currently drafted focuses on civil nuclear power reactors. Thus, other nuclear facilities, including those dealing with 4 waste management, military activities, fuel cycle activities-such as reprocessing and/or enrichment plants-and research reactors, are not covered under the convention's provisions. For example, the draft convention would not cover the nuclear reprocessing facility at a military complex in Russia where an accident occurred in April 1993.
The objectives of the draft convention are written in general terms and call on countries to achieve and attain a high level of safety to prevent nuclear accidents. Because the convention's premise is that the regulation of nuclear safety is a national responsibility, safety goals would be achieved through countries' adherence to general safety principles, such as B-2681@@ establishing a legislative framework and an independent regulatory body to govern the safety of nuclear installations, rather than to binding detailed technical standards. The convention has been characterized as incentive-oriented, designed to encourage widespread support, particularly among countries operating Soviet-designed reactors that lack basic safety features.
The draft convention provides for a peer review process to monitor adherence to the provisions of the convention. Through this process-the details of which have not been determined-it is envisioned that country representatives would have an opportunity to review other countries' measures to improve safety and could exert peer pressure to affect changes.
Although the convention concept is supported by a diverse group of IAEA member state representatives, views differ regarding several issues. For example, the United States and 6 other country representatives told us that they favor a scope limited to civil nuclear power plants, while 16 country representatives told us that they support a broader convention covering, for example, radioactive waste facilities or reprocessing facilities in addition to power plants. One country did not provide a final position on the scope of the convention. Representatives from 21 of the 24 IAEA member states that we met with, including U.S. officials, told us that they favor a convention based on general safety principles and oppose an international enforcement mechanism because the safe operation and maintenance of nuclear reactors is a national responsibility. Most of these countries operate nuclear power plants. Representatives we spoke with from three countries-none of which operate civil nuclear power plants but do neighbor countries operating nuclear power plants-prefer binding technical standards and an international regulatory body to oversee the convention's implementation. b
The majority of country representatives and some IAEA officials believe the convention is a positive step towards promoting and strengthening international nuclear safety and perhaps increasing public confidence in the nuclear power industry. However, a few other representatives and other IAEA officials were less optimistic. They noted that without establishing procedures for addressing existing problem reactors, including time frames for upgrading their safety, the convention will not improve nuclear safety. In addition, they told us that the convention could easily be considered weak and lacking in substance by nuclear power The objectives of the draft convention are written in general rather than detailed, technical, and prescriptive terms. For example, the convention calls on countries to take all appropriate measures to (1) protect people and the environment from the harmful effects of radiation and (2) prevent the occurrence of nuclear accidents. The convention proposes that countries cooperate to reach these objectives and achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety. The convention does not seek to impose penalties for noncompliance.
The convention has been described as incentive-oriented, designed to maxWise the number of countries that will support and sign it. A State Department off%al said that a major reason for developing an incentive-type convention was to make it acceptable and useful to countries with problem reactors, particularly the former Soviet Union and eastern European nations. According to U.S. officials, the main purpose of the convention is to get these countries, as well as developing nations, to make commitments to improve their reactors and develop a safety culture.' The U.S. officials believe that these countries probably would not sign a prescriptive or stringent convention that they could not comply with.
The draft convention states that overall responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the country where a nuclear installation is located. Therefore, the convention seeks to achieve its objectives through countries' adhering to general safety principles rather than to binding technical standards. These principles, or safety fundamentals, embodied in the draft convention represent international consensus by experts on basic safety concepts for the regulation and operation of nuclear installations. 'l'he principles comprise the most general level of guidelines in the hierarchy of IAEA'S nuclear safety series publications2
The principles, in part, call on each country to take the following actions: b l Establish and maintain a legislative framework and independent regulatory body to govern the safety of nuclear installations through regulations, licensing, inspection, and enforcement.
l Establish procedures to ensure that technical aspects of nuclear reactor safety are adequately considered and continuously evaluated throughout %afety culture impliea individual and organizational awareness of and commitment to the importance of safety. It also refers to the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engaged in any activity that has a besring on the safety of nuclear power plants.
%iEA's safety series also includes more detailed standards, guides, and practices. In t&al, these guidelines provide a reference for developing national safea regulationa in certain cases.
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the life of the installation. These technical aspects include siting, design and construction, and operation and maintenance. For example, countries would be required to establish procedures to evaluate the impact of a nuclear installation's site selection on the environment and ensure that the design of the mstallation provides for levels of protection against the release of radioactive materials.
l Establish a safety management system to ensure that an acceptable level of safety is maintained throughout the life of the installation. This is to be achieved by giving priority to safety, establishing a quality assurance program, ensuring that staff are adequately trained, performing periodic safety assessments, and establishing an emergency preparedness plan.
Convention to Be Implemented by Peer Review Process
As currently drafted, the convention would be implemented by periodic meetings of the signatory countries-a peer review process. Although the details of this process have not been determined by the working group, the draft convention contains proposals that the meetings will (1) establish the structure, content, and time frames for status reports to be submitted by the signatory countries; (2) review and assess how the counties are meeting the convention's obligations; and (3) carry out advisory functions to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear power plant safety.
These meetings are an essential element of the convention and should provide a forum for reviewing countries' measures to improve safety. At a February 1993 IAEA general conference meeting, the U.S. representative noted that the convention should establish a mandatory process for exerting peer pressure on countries with weak nuclear safety programs to substantially improve them.
The role of LAEA--an agency that promotes improvements in nuclear power reactor safety-in implementing the convention has not been agreed upon, but it is unlikely that the agency will have any enforcement or regulatory responsibility. As drafted, the convention proposes that IAEA serve as the Secretariat to the meeting of the parties. In this capacity, IAEA would (1) convene, prepare, and service the meetings; (2) transmit reports and information to member countries; and (3) All of the representatives we spoke with agreed that, at a minimum, the convention should cover civil nuclear power plants. However, the majority of these representatives told us that the final convention should not be limited to these installations. Of the 24 representatives, 16 favored a convention covering a wider range of facilities and most frequently cited the need to include radioactive waste disposal. Other facilities or elements mentioned were fuel reprocessing, transportation of nuclear material, military facilities, and research reactors. One country representative did not provide a final position on the scope of the convention. 4 Representatives told us that a nuclear accident, regardless of its source, is potentially dangerous. In their view, a convention addressing other sources of radiation would demonstrate the international community's recognition of the broader issues involving nuclear safety. Many of the representatives who support a broader scope for the final convention told us that their countries might be willing to accept a convention limited to nuclear power plants as a first step, with the understanding that additional nuclear facilities would be addressed in future conventions.
We interviewed repreaentativea from Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cuba, Fhland, lhnce, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United Staten.
Seven country representatives, including the United States, favor a scope limited to nuclear power reactors, in part because they pose the most serious risk. In addition, State Department and NRC officials told us that it was thought early agreement could be reached on a finaJ text of the convention if it was limited to nuclear power reactors. In addition, an NRC official told us that the United States is committed to continuing the convention process and would be an active participant in any future safety conventions addressing other nuclear facilities.
Most Countries Favor General Principles Over Binding Standards
Of the 24 countries whose representatives we interviewed, including the United States, 21 support a convention based on general safety principles, not binding safety standards. With one exception, these countries have nuclear power plants in operation or under construction. Several member country representatives said that the general principles included in the draft convention are adequate to establish minimum acceptable standards of safety. Officials from the United States and several other countries noted that standards could infringe on national sovereignty or conilict with national laws and policies. A DOE official said that detailed standards are not well suited for development into international standards. He said that the diversity of plants in operation worldwide and of those planned for the future makes it difficult for a set of detailed standards to be applied broadly and still to provide recognition of individual reactor design requirements.
The representatives of the United States and other countries told us that it would be time-consuming and complex to translate safety standards into acceptable binding international language. Furthermore, the United States has maintained that international standards could commit the signatory countries to a less rigorous set of obligations than many national programs have adopted-a "lowest common denominator" approach to nuclear 4 safety.
Representatives from three non-nuclear power countries, all of which neighbor countries with operating nuclear power reactors, told us that they favor a convention based on binding international technical safety standards. Officials from these countries said that detailed, prescriptive standards would provide fhm obligations and serve as criteria for measuring progress made toward nuclear safety. Two of these countries' officials disagreed with the lowest common denominator argument made by the United States. The officials said that the Western nations already exceed the proposed international nuclear safety standards. Furthermore, B.268106 the ofMals believe that standards are necessary to bring countries with problem reactors up to minimum acceptable levels of safety.
While most countries do not favor a convention based on binding standards, working group delegates are debating the value of using standards as a reference to measure countries' progress toward improving safely. Various countries in the working group favor using international standards for this purpose. Furthermore, some representatives that were opposed to a convention based on technical standards supported the idea of using standards for the peer review process. 'l'he U.S. delegation was among several countries opposed to this idea, especially if the standards were to be assigned special recognition in the convention. The United States based its opposition, in part, on the belief that experience and expertise in operating nuclear reactors are the key to the peer review process, not standards. At the last working group meeting in January 1993, no agreement was reached on what role, if any, standards should play.
Most Countries Oppose
Representatives of 21 countries, including the United States, told us that Intkrnational Enforcement they are opposed to having an international organization, such as IAEA, or Regulatory Body enforce the convention. The same countries that favor general principles over technical standards oppose international enforcement for many of the same reasons. These countries are opposed to a regulatory body, I / primarily because they believe it would infringe upon their national sovereignty.
Several country representatives told us that countries with problem reactors would be discouraged from signing an enforcement-oriented convention. In their view, these countries should be part of the process if the convention is going to have a positive impact on improving international nuclear safety. Representatives from three non-nuclear A power countries told us that enforcement and verification procedures are essential to ensure that countries are meeting their obligations. Furthermore, two of these countries favor mandatory international inspections, possibly by IAE~ I Poitential Benefits and
The nuclear safety convention concept enjoys broad support among a L&t&ions of the diverse group of countries. Although many member country representatives do not view the convention as a panacea or quick fix, the mqiority believe it is a positive step toward improving international nuclear safety. A U.S. government representative said that the convention's primary benefits would be (1) promoting a nuclear safety culture and (2) obtaining improvements in nuclear reactors located in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and developing countries. Various member country representatives said that, in addition to promoting a global safely culture, the convention could increase public awareness and confidence in nuclear safety. Some IAEA offkials, who are a&sting in the working group, believe the convention is a worthwhile effort because it will bring countries together to discuss safety issues as part of a systematic process.
A few primarily non-nuclear power countries, as well as some IAEA of!'icials, believe that the proposed convention hss serious limitations. One country representative said that the convention needs to change the status quo and improve the safety of problem reactors. However, in his view, the draft convention would not achieve this objective. A few member country offkials noted that without establishing procedures for addressing existing problem reactors, including time frames for upgrading their safety, the convention would not improve nuclear safety. The Director of IAEA'S Division of Nuclear Safety told us that the convention could easily be considered weak and lacking in substance by nuclear power opponents. The Deputy Director noted that unless the convention addresses those reactors where perceived safety deficiencies exist, it is technically flawed.
Obbervations complex and difficult. This is understandable, given the various perceptions and expectations of countries as to what a nuclear safety convention should contain and what it should accomplish. Agreement has not been reached on the substantive provisions regarding the scope and the level of technical detail of safety standards or principles to be adhered to by member countries.
A
The sovereign rights of participating countries could be affected by the final convention document. Although member states differ on the elements that the convention should contain, they share the common goal of wanting to improve nuclear power reactor safety through greater international cooperation. 'The member states also seem to agree that safety is an international responsibility because of the potential transboundary effects of radiation released from an accident.
It is premature to assess the impact of the nuclear safety convention, the success of which depends on many factors, including getting most of the nations with nuclear power plants to sign onto the convention and adhere to ita terms. However, some preliminary observations can be made at this time. The draft convention doea not provide measurable criteria to gauge the safety improvements of the countries, particularly those with problem reactors. Using benchmark criteria in the peer review process could aid in assessing and monitoring progress in upgrading the safety of civil nuclear power plants. In general, these officials agreed with the facts presented in this report and gave us additional clarifying information. We have revised the text as necessary. However, as requested, we did not obtain written agency comments on a draft of this report.
Slope and Methodology
To obtain a broad range of views on the nuclear safety convention, we Judgmentally selected 24 IAEA member countries to include in our review. As of December 31,1992,18 of the 24 countries operated 87 percent of the world's nuclear power plants. Among this group of countries, we wanted to ensure that we solicited the views of representatives from both highly industrialized and less-developed countries. We obtained the views of some of those countries with Soviet-designed reactors, such as the Russian Federation and Bulgaria. We also sought views from two countries that do not currently operate civil nuclear power plants but are constructing them-Cuba and Romania.
Finally, we met with representatives from four countries that do not currently have active civil nuclear power programs-Austria, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. We selected these countries to ensure that we included the views of non-nuclear power countries that neighbor countries operating civil nuclear power plants.
We met with officials from all of these countries to obtain their views on the drait convention. These officials Included country representatives to IAE~, legal and technical experts, and other knowledgeable government officials. Whenever possible, we sought to verify foreign countries' positions by comparing their representatives' views with formal statements provided at IAEA general conferences and other available information. We provided officials from each country with a summary of information and requested that it be reviewed by other cognizant government representatives for accuracy and completeness.
Representatives from all 23 foreign countries responded between December 1992 and March 1993. One country's positions were presented as prehminary and subject to further review.
To obtain the views of the U.S. government, we met with ofIicials from the Departments of State and Energy and NRC. We also met with officials from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System Organizations, Vienna, Austria; and the U.S. Mission to the European Communities, Brussels, Belgium. We obtained pertinent documents that detailed U.S. positions on the safety convention.
To help identify key elements and objectives of the convention, we attended the October 1992 and January 1993 sessions of the nuclear safety working group in Vienna, Austria. We reviewed pertinent convention-related reports prepared by IAEA and other relevant documentation prepared by the participating countries. We also obtained the views of officials and additional documentation from IAEA; the Paris, Prance, Center of the World Association of Nuclear Operators; the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and the Co mmission of the European Communities.
We performed our review between August 1992 and March 1993 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we plan to send copies of this report to other interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of State and Page11 tUO/lWED-BB-163Nnclw&fety 
